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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daniel Robert Franks appeals from the judgment

jury

verdict finding him guilty of aggravated battery.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On December 15, 2012, Robert Knox complained to law enforcement and
animal control authorities that Franks' dogs were digging holes under the fence
that separated his and Franks' back yards.

(Tr. 1 , p.185, L.22 - p.188, L.16,

p.231, L.18 - p.233, L.19, p.390, Ls.2-8, p.398, L.24 - p.399, L.11.) An animal
control officer responded to Franks' residence, told Franks and his wife about Mr.
Knox's complaint, took their names in case the situation "escalated," and asked
them to fill the holes.

(Tr., p.188, Ls.1

19, p.400, L.11 - p.401, L.7, p.401,

Ls.16-20.) Franks was upset that Mr. Knox had reported him to animal control,
but he and his stepson filled the holes the same day.

(Tr., p.190, Ls.13-17,

p.234, Ls.5-15, p.401, Ls.8-15, p.401, L.24 - p.402, L.11, p.461, L.24 - p.462,
L.2.)
Early the next day, Franks began drinking with some friends and told them
Mr. Knox had "called the humane society on [him]." (Tr., p.407, L.22 - p.408,
L.15, p.409, Ls.9-17, p.412, L.5- p.413, L.2.) After having a beer at his friends'

house, Franks and his friends went to a bar in Garden City, where Franks had

1

The appellate record contains several separately bound volumes of transcripts.
As used in this brief, the citation "Tr." refers to the transcript of the trial
proceedings.
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two or three "Jack and Coke[s]." (Tr., p.409, Ls.9-24, p.415, Ls.6-18.) Mr. Knox
was also at the bar, but Franks was unaware of that fact until one of his friends
came back from the restroom and told him Mr. Knox was there and was
complaining about Franks' dogs and threatening to shoot them. (Tr., p.191, L.4
- p.192, L.2, p.411, L.11 - p.414, L.21.) Franks left the bar without speaking to

Mr. Knox. (Tr., p.192, L.16-p.193, L.5, p.414, L.22-p.415, L.25.)
After leaving the bar, Franks drove one of his friends home and took the
other to Nampa, where he dropped him off at Stacy Stradly's house. (Tr., p.415,
L.23 - p.419, L.2.)

Franks then drove to Tracy Fackler's house to pick up his

nephew, Justin Peterson.

(Tr., p.306, L.5 - p.307, L.3, p.308, Ls.9-22, p.417,

L.22 - p.481, L.8, p.419, Ls.2-15.) While Franks was at Ms. Fackler's house,
Ms. Fackler overheard him tell Mr. Peterson that his (Franks') neighbor "had
called the cops on him for his dog barking and that he was going to beat him up."
(Tr., p.308, L.9 - p.309, L.9.) When Ms. Fackler confronted Franks and told him
he had better not get Mr. Peterson involved, Franks responded, "[N]o, no, no, I'm
just joking. I'm not going to do nothing. Stacy Stradly said that he would beat
him up for me." (Tr., p.309, L.20 - p.310, L.7.) Soon thereafter, Franks and Mr.
Peterson left Ms. Fackler's house and went back to Stacy Strad!y's house, where
they "started drinking." (Tr., p.310, L.23 - p.311, L.5, p.421, L.25 - p.422, L.8.)
Several hours later, Franks and Mr. Peterson drove back to Garden City
and paid Mr. Knox a visit. (Tr., p.422, L.25 - p.425, L.17, p.429, L.18 - p.431,
L.22.) Franks knocked on Mr. Knox's front door while Mr. Peterson stood three
to four feet behind him - just outside a foyer area - and held open the screen

2

(Tr.,

1

15-p.197, L.18, p.243, L.17-p.244, L.19, p.288, Ls.5-8,

, L. 17 - p.435, L.17.) When

Knox opened the door,

said, "You'll

never fucking call the cops again," and then "sucker punched" Mr. Knox in the
face and grabbed him by the shirt and pulled him outside.

(Tr., p.198, L.5 -

p.200, L.2.) Mr. Knox has no clear memory of what happened next. (Tr., p.200,
Ls.3-17.)

At some point, however, he called 911.

(Tr., p.200, L 16 - p.201,

L.11.) When officers responded to Mr. Knox's residence, it was evident he had
been severely beaten; his face was swollen and bloody and he was having
difficulty standing and breathing.

(Tr., p.285, L.12 - p.285, L.9, p.294, L.21 -

p.295, L.4, p.324, L.14 - p.325, L.4; State's Exhibits 6-9.)

He suffered a

concussion and multiple facial fractures and, ultimately, had to undergo several
reconstructive surgeries. (See generally Tr., pp.141-75, 375-82.)
Law enforcement began looking for Franks almost immediately after
responding to Mr. Knox's residence on the evening of December 16, 2012. (Tr.,
p.269, L.5 - p.272, L.23, p.295, L.21 - p.296, L.2, p.326, L.22 - p.327, L.6,
p.329, L.24 - p.334, L.5.)

Franks was aware that the police wanted to speak

with him, but he intentionally avoided them until the next day. (Tr., p.334, Ls.614, p.445, L.3 - p.446, L.3, p.471, L.10 - p.472, L.3.) When Franks did submit
to an interview, he told the police that neither he nor Justin Peterson were
responsible for Mr. Knox's injuries. (Tr., p.341, L.2 - p.342, L.3, p.344, L.1 0 p.345, L.1, p.345, Ls.17-23.) Franks was aware when the police interviewed him
that they had also interviewed Mr. Peterson and Mr. Peterson was "saying
[Franks] did it." (Tr., p.345, L.24 - p.346, L.3, p.457, Ls.9-18.)

3

The state charged Franks with aggravated battery under the alternative
theories that he personally battered Robert Knox or that he aided and abetted
another in doing so.

(R., pp.33-34, 54-55.)

At trial, Mr. Knox testified and

positively identified Franks as the individual who attacked him. (Tr., p.196, L.11
- p.198, L.4, p.199, L.22 - p.200, L.2.) Franks testified on his own behalf and
claimed to have had nothing to do with the attack.

(Tr., p.431, L.19 - p.432,

L.18, p.433, L.25 - p.434, L.13, p.435, L.1 - p.441, L.6, p.442, Ls.16-25.) He
admitted he was at Mr. Knox's house when he was beaten but claimed that
Justin Peterson was the sole attacker.

(Tr., p.434, L.14- p.441, L.6, p.442,

Ls.16-25.) He also testified that - although he witnessed the attack, did nothing
to stop it, and made no efforts to render or secure any aid for Mr. Knox - he did
not in any way assist in or encourage the commission of the crime. (Tr., p.434,
L.14 - p.441, L.6, p.442, Ls.16-25, p.468, L.16 - p.469, L.5.)
During the defense case-in-chief, Franks' attorney advised the trial court,
outside the presence of the jury, that he intended to call Justin Peterson as a
witness.

(Tr., p.501, Ls.16-17.)

Counsel represented that Mr. Peterson was

"interviewed in this case while he was on felony probation" and "gave a story
about what had happened." (Tr., p.501, L.21 - p.502, L.2.) Counsel continued,
"Obviously we'll point the finger at Justin Peterson in this case."

(Tr., p.502,

Ls.3-5.) But, based on Mr. Peterson's interview, defense counsel did not have
any reason to believe that Mr. Peterson would "take the Fifth" if called as a
witness (Tr., p.502, Ls.5-6, p.503, Ls.12-14); in fact, counsel advised the court:
"I think he's going to get up on the stand and accuse Mr. Franks of committing
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the crime" (Tr., p.

1

4).

currently
defense

Nevertheless, recognizing Mr. Peterson was
charge

asked

not represented by an

court whether it felt Mr. Peterson needed to

"instructed on his rights." (Tr., p.501, Ls.17-18, p.502, L.11 - p.503, L.4.)
court determined it should engage Mr. Peterson in such a discussion outside the
jury's presence. (Tr., p.504, L.23 - p.505, L.1, p.505, Ls.17-19.)
Once Mr. Peterson was in the courtroom, the trial court asked him
whether he was "willing to testify in this case."

(Tr., p.506, Ls.6-22.)

Mr.

Peterson responded that he was not willing to do so, and he maintained that
position after the court advised him of his Fifth Amendment rights. (Tr., p.506,
L.23 - p.507, L.16.) When asked by the court whether, if called upon to testify,
he would "assert [hisJ Fifth Amendment right to remain silent," Mr. Peterson
responded, "Yeah, I could do that." (Tr., p.507, L.17 - p.508, L.2.) Mr. Peterson
subsequently clarified, in response to questioning by defense counsel and the
prosecutor, that he was not worried about incriminating himself; he was
concerned about being "labeled a rat" at the prison and not being "able to do
good time." (Tr., p.508, L.8 - p.510, L.1.)
In light of Mr. Peterson's representation that he was not asserting any
Fifth Amendment privilege, defense counsel asked the court to "order him to
testify. And if he refuses to testify after that, the jury's allowed to draw whatever
inferences they want from that."

(Tr., p.510, L.22 - p.511, L.4.)

Counsel

continued:
I think he needs to appear in front of the jury and I'll ask him
questions and if there are particularly questions he doesn't want to
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answer, then he just doesn't answer them, but - or maybe he
decides to answer some of my questions, but not others.
But he doesn't have a privilege to do what he's doing right
now. And that's - my problem is that - so he does it outside the
scope of the jury and they never see him ....
(Tr., p.512, Ls.14-24.)

The court indicated it was not inclined to require Mr.

Peterson to take the witness stand, reasoning:
I think it would be a waste of time and confusing to the jury especially confusing to the jury to have somebody come in and say
I'm not going to - say what's your name, none of your business,
see you folks, when I can simply advise the jury that Mr. Peterson
was brought in and indicated to the Court that he would not answer
any questions and let the jury make - make whatever inferences
they want to draw from that.

(Tr., p.513, L.21 - p.514, L.4.)
Upon further questioning under oath, Mr. Peterson reiterated that he did
not want to testify because he was "worried about repercussions out at the
prison."

(Tr., p.516, Ls.2-24.)

He also indicated that, "if anyone were to ask

[him] if [his] version of the events [of December 16, 2012] has changed," he
would say, "No." (Tr., p.520, Ls.3-6.)
Given Mr. Peterson's responses to questioning, the trial court decided to
follow its initial inclination and not require Mr. Peterson to take the witness stand
simply to refuse to testify. (Tr., p.520, Ls.8-24.) The court reasoned:
Mr. Peterson has told us he's not going to testify. If he's sworn and
then he answers some questions of the prosecutor and says then I
am not going to tell anything else because that will put a rat jacket
on me, the clear inference is, well, if I had testified, I would have
said he's the guy that did it and he's not testifying to it. So I think
that that's - that's potentially prejudicial.

6

I think the best thing to do is just simply tell the jury that ...
- that he will not testify and
the witness has indicated that he
leave it at that and
you folks argue.
.8-24.)

(Tr., p.

also noted

the record, "I did not threaten the

witness with contempt sanctions because I think that would just be a waste of
time." (Tr., p.521, Ls.3-6.)
When the jury returned to the courtroom, the trial court advised them as
follows:
[YJou have heard the name Justin Peterson during the course of
this trial. Mr. Peterson was called as a witness. He came into
court and he has indicated that he - he will refuse to testify so that
he was excused and he will not be testifying today.
(Tr., p.525, Ls.12-20.)

Defense counsel then called his next witness, Dave

Navarro, who, because Mr. Peterson was "unavailable," was permitted to testify
over the state's hearsay objection as to statements he claimed Mr. Peterson
made to him on the night Mr. Knox was attacked. (Tr., p.515, Ls.3-19, p.521, L.7
- p.524, L.8, p.526, L.7 - p.533, L.6.) Specifically, Mr. Navarro testified that Mr.
Peterson called him and told him he had "been in a fight in Boise" and "had
messed somebody up pretty good." (Tr., p.531, Ls.11-25.)
At the conclusion of the evidence, both the state and defense counsel
argued the significance of Mr. Peterson's refusal to testify.

The prosecutor

suggested Mr. Peterson "might have a lot of reasons he might not want to say
what really happened under oath in front of a jury," including a fear of retaliation.
(Tr., p.604, L.18 - p.605, L.21.) Defense counsel, on the other hand, argued Mr.
Peterson refused to testify because he was the one who "beat Robert Knox."
(Tr., p.618, Ls.6-22.)

7

Ultimately, the jury found Franks gui!ty of aggravated battery. (R., p.97;
Tr., p.632, L.23 - p.634, L.18.)

The district court entered a judgment of

conviction and imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed. (R.,
pp.128-31.) Franks timely appealed. (R., pp.134-37.)
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ISSUE
states the

on appeal as:

Were Mr. Franks' Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process
and to present a defense violated when the district court refused to
order the recalcitrant witness to testify under threat of contempt
and when it denied his requests that the witness refuse before the
jury?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Franks failed show that the district court violated his Sixth
Amendment rights to compulsory process and to present a defense, either by
declining Franks' request that Mr. Peterson be called to the witness stand for the
sole purpose of refusing to testify in front of the jury, or by not ordering Mr.
Peterson to testify under the threat of contempt when it is clear from the record
such threat would have been futile?

9

ARGUMENT
Franks Has Failed To Show Any Violation Of His Sixth Amendment Rights To
Compulsory Process And To Present A Defense
Introduction
Franks argues his "Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and to
court refused to order [Justin

present a defense were violated when the

Peterson] to testify under threat of contempt and when it denied his request that
[Mr. Peterson]

before the jury."

(Appellant's brief, p.5 (capitalization

altered, underlining omitted).) Franks' arguments

for several reasons. First,

Franks had no Sixth Amendment right to have Mr. Peterson take stand for the
sole purpose of refusing to testify in front of the jury.

Second, the record

supports the trial court's finding that ordering Mr. Peterson to testify under threat
of contempt would have been futile. Finally, the record shows Franks was not
prejudiced by the procedures employed by the trial court and, in fact, benefited
from the district court's rulings; any error was thus harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and does entitle Franks to a new trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 !daho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
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C.

Franks Had No Sixth Amendment Right To Call Mr. Peterson To The
Witness Stand For The Sole Purpose Of Refusing To Testify In Front Of
The Jury
The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, made applicable

the states by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a
"fundamental element of due process of law." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 19 (1967); accord State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 239, 220 P.3d 1055, 1058
(2009); State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 634-35, 167 P.3d 765, 771-72
(2007); State v. Ramsey, 99 Idaho 1, 2, 576 P.2d 572, 573 (1978). "Compulsory
process 'is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may
decide where the truth lies."' Dalrymple, 144 Idaho at 634-35, 167 P.3d at 77172 (quoting Washington, 388 U.S. at 19).
The right to compulsory process is not absolute, however.

lsi at 635,

167 P.3d at 772 (citation omitted) ("The right of the accused to present witnesses
in his own defense is fundamental but is not without limitation.").

it does not

provide "an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or
otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." Taylor v. Illinois, 484
U.S. 400,410 (1988); see also Ramsey, 99 Idaho at 2-3, 576 P.2d 573-74 (Sixth
Amendment right must yield to valid claim of Fifth Amendment privilege).

Nor

does a "mere deprivation of testimony ... establish a Sixth Amendment violation."
Dalrymple, 144 Idaho at 635, 167 P.3d at 772 (citing United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)). Rather, to establish a violation of
the right to compulsory process resulting from the exclusion of defense

11

witnesses, a defendant must '"at least make some plausib!e showing of how [the
witnesses'] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his
defense."'

~ (quoting Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.

at 867); accord State v.

Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 676, 67 P.3d 1283, 1288 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogation
on other grounds recognized t?.y State v. Galvan, _

P.3d _ , 2014 WL

775660, *3 n.5 (Idaho App. Feb. 14, 2014). Ultimately, the right to compulsory
process "must be considered in the light of its purpose, namely, to produce
testimony for the defendant." United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9

th

Cir. 1974) (citing Washington, 388 U.S. 14); accord In Re Bizzard, 559 F.Supp.
507, 510 (S.D. Ga. 1983); State v. Acker,_ P.3d _ , 2014 WL 594334, *29
(Haw. Feb. 14, 2014) (not yet final). "Calling a witness who will refuse to testify
does not fulfill [that] purpose." Roberts, 503 F.2d at 600; accord Bizzard 559
F.Supp. at 510; Acker, 2014 WL 594334, *29.
On appeal, Franks appears to recognize there is no Sixth Amendment
right to require a defense witness claiming a valid Fifth Amendment privilege to
take the witness stand solely for the purpose of asserting the privilege in front of
the jury.

He argues, however, that because Justin Peterson "expressly

disclaimed any Fifth Amendment basis for his refusal to testify," he (Franks) had
a Sixth Amendment right to call Mr. Peterson to the stand for the sole purpose of
having him refuse to testify in the jury's presence. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-6, 8.)
Franks' attempt to distinguish between defense witnesses who invoke valid Fifth
Amendment privileges and those who refuse to testify for reasons other than
privilege is misplaced. As courts in other jurisdictions have recognized, "[o)nce a

12

witness appears in court and refuses to
process rights are exhausted.

compulsory

a

It is irrelevant whether

witness's refusal is

grounded in a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, and invalid privilege, or
something else entirely." United States v. Griffin, 66

3d 68, 70 (5

th

Cir. 1995);

accord Acker, 2014 WL 594334, *29.
The reasoning of Acker is particularly instructive. In that case, Acker was
convicted of murder following a jury trial at which her husband testified against
her. 2014 WL 594334, *1. Several years later, Acker's husband admitted during
a parole hearing that he was responsible for the murder.
conviction proceedings, Acker was granted a new trial.

kl
kl

Following post-

at **3-4.

Acker's

husband again testified for the prosecution at Acker's retrial, id. at **7-13, but,
when subpoenaed as a witness in the defense case-in-chief, Acker's husband
refused to testify, citing a "concern for his safety," id. at *16. Although mindful of
Acker's right to compulsory process, the trial court denied her request to have
her husband extracted from his courthouse cellblock for the purpose of asserting
his refusal to testify in front of the jury, concluding that doing so would not be
helpful for the jury.

kl at **16-17.

However, the court did permit Acker to call a

sheriff's deputy to testify that Acker's husband had been subpoenaed to testify
but was refusing to do so.

kl at *17.

Following her conviction on retrial, Acker appealed and argued the denial
of her request to have her husband extracted from his ce!lblock to appear in front
of the jury violated her rights to compulsory process and a fair trial.

kl

at *28.

The Hawaii Supreme Court rejected Acker's arguments, concluding "the purpose
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of compulsory process - i.e., to produce testimony for the defendant - would not

have been served by having [Acker's husband] physically extracted from the
courthouse cellblock and placed on the witness stand in front of the jury."
*31.

In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized the refusal of Acker's

husband to testify was not grounded in any Fifth Amendment invocation.
*29.

19.: at

&

at

The court nevertheless found the reasoning of Fifth Amendment cases

"pertinent" because, regardless of the basis of a witness' refusal to testify, the
purpose of the right to compulsory process - producing testimony for the
defendant - is the same.

&

Because Acker's husband was refusing to testify,

putting him on the stand necessarily would not have produced any "relevant and
material testimony benefitting the defense" and, as such, there could be no Sixth
Amendment violation.

&

at *30. The court also found it significant that Acker

was not only allowed to present evidence of her husband's refusal to testify, but
that she also specifically argued her theory of the significance of that refusal to
the jury during closing arguments. 15;:L
The facts of this case are similar to those of Acker and compel the
conclusion Franks had no Sixth Amendment right to have Mr. Peterson refuse to
testify in front of the jury. Like the defense witness in Acker, Mr. Peterson was
produced as a witness at the defense's request. (R., pp.69-70; Tr., p.501, Ls.1620.) Also like the defense witness in Acker, Mr. Peterson refused to testify, not
because of any Fifth Amendment concern, but because he was worried about
being labeled a "rat" and suffering the repercussions thereof in prison.

(Tr.,

p.506, L.9 - p.520, L.18.) Although Franks would have liked Mr. Peterson to

14

his

to

on the witness stand in front of the jury, requiring

Peterson to do so would not have served the purpose of compulsory process producing testimony for Franks.

Nor would it othervvise

produced any

material and favorable evidence from which Franks could argue his theory of the
case. The district court specifically advised the jury that Mr. Peterson had been
called as a witness and refused to testify (Tr., p.525, Ls.13-20), and Franks was
allowed to argue his theory of the significance of that fact to the jury during
closing argument (Tr., p.618, Ls.6-22). Given these circumstances, Franks, like
Acker, had no Sixth Amendment right to require Mr. Peterson to refuse to testify
in front of the jury.
Relying on State v. Whitt, 649 S.E.2d 258 (W. Va. 2007), Franks argues
that "[a]llowing a jury to see the person who is the alternate perpetrator and see
that person refuse to answer questions from the accused provides the only
legitimate alternative means by which to honor a defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights when a witness refuses to testify .... " (Appellant's brief, p.8.)

Even a

cursory review of the passage of Whitt Franks cites shows it does not stand for
such a broad proposition.
The issue in Whitt was whether the trial court erred by not requiring a
Whitt's co-defendant to take the stand to invoke her claimed Fifth Amendment
privilege in front of the jury.

kl at 260-61.

In resolving that issue in Whitt's favor,

the Whitt court held that, where "the defendant has presented sufficient evidence
to demonstrate the possible guilt of the witness for the crime the defendant is
charged with committing, the trial court has the discretion to compel such witness
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to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege in the presence of the jury." ~ at
269 (emphasis added). The court further held that, in exercising its discretion,
"the trial court should consider whether the defendant will be unfairly prejudiced
by not allowing the potentially excu!patory witness to invoke this privilege in the

jury's presence."

!si

Even assuming, as Franks suggests, that the "logic" of Whitt applies
equally to the facts of this case, there is no basis to conclude that Franks' rights
to compulsory process and to present a defense were violated by the court's
discretionary decision to not require Mr. Peterson to take the witness stand and
refuse to testify in front of the jury.

While there was certainly evidence from

which the jury could conclude that Mr. Peterson may have participated in the
aggravated battery for which Franks was on trial, Franks was not unfairly
prejudiced by the denial of his request to have Mr. Peterson take the stand and
personally assert his refusal to testify. To the contrary, the record shows Franks
actually benefited from the court's ruling in at least two respects.
First, after the trial court advised the jury of Mr. Peterson's refusal to
testify, Franks was permitted to argue to the jury that the reason Mr. Peterson
refused to testify was because he was the one who "beat Robert Knox." (Tr.,
p.618, Ls.6-22.)

This argument concerning Mr. Peterson's motive for not

testifying was not only unsupported by any evidence actually presented to the
jury, it was directly contrary to Mr. Peterson's representations outside the
presence of the jury that his initial version of events - that Franks was the sole
perpetrator

had not changed, but he did not want to be a "rat." (Tr., p.508,
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L24 - p.510,

1, p.516, Ls.20-24, p.517,

- p.519, LS.) Second, because

Peterson was not required to take the stand, the district court declared
"unavailable" and permitted Franks to

testimony from another defense

witness that Mr. Peterson had made statements implicating himself in the crime.
(Tr., p.515, Ls.3-15, p.521, L7 - p.524, L.8, p.531, L.11 - p.533, L6.) Because
Franks was able to make argument and present evidence that would not
otherwise would have been available to him, it is clear that if anyone was
prejudiced by the district court's ruling it was the state, not Franks.
''The Sixth Amendment requires that a witness be brought to court, but it
does not require that he take the stand after refusing to testify." Griffin, 66 F.3d
at 70 (footnoted omitted).

Because Franks had no Sixth Amendment right to

have Mr. Peterson take the stand to refuse to testify in the jury's presence, he
has failed to show that the trial court violated his rights by not requiring Mr.
Peterson to do so.

D.

The Trial Court Was Not Required To Threaten Mr. Peterson With
Contempt Sanctions Before Excusing Him As A Witness Where Such
Threats Would Have Been Futile
For the first time on appeal, Franks argues that, before excusing Mr.

Peterson as a witness, the trial court should have attempted to compel his
testimony by threatening to hold him in contempt and that, by not doing so, the
court violated Franks' constitutional right to compulsory process.

(Appellant's

brief, pp.5-9.) This Court should decline to consider the merits of this argument
because Franks never asked the trial court to threaten Mr. Peterson with
contempt sanctions, and he has failed on appeal to even argue that the court's
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failure to do so constitutes fundamental error.

See State v. Perry , 150 Idaho

209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010) (appellate court will not consider issues

raised for first time on appeal unless defendant demonstrates fundamental
error). Even if this Court does reach the issue, a review of the record supports
the district court's sua sponte finding that threatening Mr. Peterson with contempt
would have been futile under the facts of this case.
It is beyond dispute that a recalcitrant witness may be held in criminal
contempt for his or her refusal to testify in a criminal proceeding. See I.C. §§ 18801 (6), 19-3010.

A witness who so refuses is guilty of a misdemeanor,

punishable by up to a six-month jail sentence, or up to a $1000.00 fine, or both.
I.C. §§ 18-113, 18-801(6).
In this case, the district court recognized its discretion to threaten Mr.
Peterson with contempt sanctions for refusing to testify but found that doing so
"would just be a waste of time." (Tr., p.521, Ls.3-6.) The record supports this
finding. At the time Mr. Peterson was called as a witness in this case, he was
already incarcerated in the penitentiary on an unrelated aggravated assault
charge. (Tr., p.501, L.116-p.503, L.1.) When questioned about his willingness
to testify in front of the jury, Mr. Peterson repeatedly insisted he would not do so
because he did not want to be labeled a "rat" in prison. (Tr., p.506, L.9 - p.510,
L.1, p.516, L.10 - p.519, L.23.) In light of the fact that Mr. Peterson was already
incarcerated on a more serious charge and was refusing to testify for the very
reason that he was concerned about his well-being in prison, there is little reason
to believe that threatening him with contempt sanctions such as an additional six-
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month jail sentence and/or a fine would have persuaded him to testify; whether
incarcerated solely on the felony or also on a misdemeanor contempt charge, he
would still be subject to being labeled a rat and suffering the repercussions
thereof while incarcerated.

Compare State v. Acker, 2014 WL 594334, *31

(Haw. Feb. 14, 2014) (recognizing futility of threatening defense witness who
was already serving a life sentence with contempt sanctions for his refusal to
testify).
In an attempt to support his claim that the district court was required to
threaten Mr. Peterson with contempt sanctions before excusing him as a
witness, Franks relies on State v.

Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 288 (Ct.

App. 2000). Barcella is inapposite because, as even Franks acknowledges, the
issue in that case was limited to determining whether a witness who refused to
testify but was not threatened with contempt sanctions was truly "unavailable"
such that his out-of-court statements were admissible pursuant to a hearsay
exception requiring the unavailability of the declarant; the case did not even
address, much less decide, the Sixth Amendment question at issue in this case. 2
Even if Barcella were relevant, the state submits its holding - that a trial court is
required to threaten a recalcitrant witness with contempt before declaring the

!='ranks' reliance on Barcella is somewhat ironic because, immediately after Mr.
Peterson refused to testify, Fanks' counsel asked the court to declare Mr.
Peterson "unavailable" for the purpose of introducing his hearsay statements,
and the district court accommodated that request without first threatening, or
even being asked to threaten, Mr. Peterson with contempt. (Tr., p.515, Ls.3-15,
p.521, L.7 - p.524, L.8, p.531, L.11 - p.533, L.6.)
2
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witness unavailable - would not apply where, as here, it is clear from the record
that such threats would be futile.
The record supports the district court's finding that that attempting to
compel Mr. Peterson's testimony by threatening him with contempt would have
been futile. Because such threats would not have produced any testimony for
Franks, Franks has failed to show any violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

If There Was Error, It Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

E.

Even if this Court concludes the trial court erred, either by not ordering Mr.
Peterson to testify under threat of contempt or by not requiring him to take the
stand and assert his refusal to testify in front of the jury, such error was
harmless. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected .... " I.R.E. 103(a).
"Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. Where, as here, an error concerns evidence
improperly excluded at trial, the test for harmless error is whether there is a
reasonable probably that the lack of the excluded evidence contributed to the
verdict.

State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843,847,979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999); State

v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000).
Reviewing the trial record in this case, there can be no question that any
error in the exclusion of Mr. Peterson's testimony - or refusal to testify - did not
contribute to the jury's verdict. After Mr. Peterson was excused as a witness,
Franks took advantage of his "unavailability" and elicited testimony from another
defense witness that Mr. Peterson had made statements implicating himself in
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the crime. (Tr., p.515, Ls.3-15, p.521, L.7 - p.524, L.8, p.531, L.11 - p.533, L.6.)
He also argued to the jury that the reason Mr. Peterson refused to testify was
because he, not Franks, was the person who "beat Mr. Knox." (Tr., p.618, Ls.622.) This argument was directly contrary to Mr. Peterson's testimony under oath
outside the presence of the jury (see Tr., p.516, L.2 - p.520, L.6), but the jury
was never made aware of that fact because Mr. Peterson was not required to
testify.

The exclusion of Mr. Peterson's testimony thus actually worked to

Franks' benefit and could not have contributed to the jury's finding of guilt.
Undoubtedly, what ultimately led to Franks' undoing was not that he was
not permitted to call Mr. Peterson as a witness, but that the evidence against him
overwhelmingly established his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That evidence,
including Franks' own testimony, showed Franks was upset with Mr. Knox for
reporting him to animal control and, on the day of the crime, he (1) told at least
three people about Mr. Knox having called the humane society on him, (2)
threatened to beat up Mr. Knox or have someone else do it for him, (3)
confronted Mr. Knox at his home, (4) was present during the entirety of the
attack on Mr. Knox and did nothing to stop it, and (5) intentionally eluded law
enforcement's attempts to contact him; in addition, Mr. Knox positively identified
Franks as the person who attacked him. (See Statement of Facts and Course of
Proceedings, and citations to the trial transcript therein, supra.)

Given this

evidence, which overwhelmingly established that Mr. Knox was at the very least
an aider and abettor in the commission of the crime, there can be no doubt that
the jury would have reached the same verdict irrespective of whether Mr.
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Peterson had been required to take the stand and refuse to testify in the jury's
presence.

Any error was therefore harmless and does not entitle Franks to

reversal of his conviction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Franks guilty of aggravated battery.
DATED this 10th day of June 2014.
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